Abstract In this paper a framework for empirical analysis is introduced that allows for a dynamic analysis of the interactions between different types of actors and institutions. We elaborate our argument by focusing on a complex phenomenon-corporatism-to show how this concept can be developed into a measure that travels across nations and time. The heuristic framework we developed adequately captures the interactive behaviour of the relevant actors within a corporatist institutional context. We demonstrate the usefulness of this framework for the analysis of policy formation by applying it to Dutch incomes policy. We contend that this heuristic framework contributes to alleviating the often discussed methodological trade-off between single case studies and cross-national comparisons. We also argue that it can bridge the gap between qualitative and quantitative approaches. Lastly, we propose that it can be used for empirical analysis of policy-making processes in other policy areas.
allows for a large number of variables and can rule out rival hypotheses by including control variables. On the downside there is often need for substantial stretching of concepts to be able to fit all cases, and it is often not clear what the substantive importance of the findings exactly is (Landman 2004; Collier and Mahon 1993; Sartori 1970) .
Single cases on the other hand allow for thick descriptions that range across many political and institutional variables and involve in-depth understanding of the specifics of the case. Case studies also allow for hypothesis generation, theory confirming and infirming, the interpretation of deviant cases and historical analysis (Lijphart 1971; Hall 2006) . On the downside it is usually quite difficult to validate the analytical results in a generalising way. Case based research may also involve implicit comparisons that are derived from and can only be understood within the (national) context in which the case is developed. Finally, the theoretical inference of case studies is low vis-à-vis the systematic comparison of multiple cases (Dogan and Pelassy 1990; Castles 1989; Przeworski 1987) .
To overcome this dilemma various research strategies have been suggested. Single case studies may be used as crucial cases to test theories developed on the basis of comparative analysis (Yin 1989; Landman 2004) ; as sources of information (data) for real comparison (Peters 1998) ; as points of reference for benchmarking or judging general trends (Pennings et al. 2006) ; or as data for comparisons based on Boolean analysis or Fuzzy-set logic (Ragin 2000; Pennings 2003; Vis 2006) .
The analytical framework developed in this article is designed to alleviate this methodological trade-off between comparing multiple cases and researching a single case by combining elements of both research strategies: comparing multiple cases derived from a qualitative description and turning this information into a systematic analysis within a comparative context. The aim is to provide a technique to collect and organize comparable data that can be analysed across time and across systems yielding valid internal and external results (Bartolini 1993; Mahoney 2000) .
The paper is structured as follows. First the concept of corporatism as a government strategy for conflict regulation will be elaborated. Next the use of this concept in comparative research will be highlighted. Based on this actor oriented approach of corporatism which is embedded in an institutional arrangement, a heuristic framework will be developed that can systematically capture the behaviour of the relevant actors involved in corporatist policy-making: government, trade unions and employers' organisations. The usefulness of this heuristic framework will then be demonstrated by applying that framework to selected cases of the formation and implementation of Dutch incomes policy after 1965. 1 The paper concludes with a discussion of the contribution of this framework to cross-national research into complex configurations on a system's level that are hitherto usually represented as categorical and thus static variables (Brady and Collier 2004 ).
Corporatism: from theoretical concept to empirical observation
Over time scholars have proposed different solutions to relate theoretical ideas on corporatism to empirical observation (e.g., Lijphart and Crépaz 1991; Keman and Pennings 1995; Siaroff 1999; Vergunst 2004) . Measures of corporatist interest representation and intermediation as regards public policy-making on socio-economic matters can be distinguished by the following aspects: the number and behavioural characteristics of the actors involved; the type of scaling techniques used to capture the level of corporatism; and the incorporation of institutions.
Most indexes on corporatism cover either bipartite or tripartite modes of representation (the number of actors involved drives the operationalisation). These concern either the interactions between employers' organisations and trade unions, or the same actors and the government. Hence, the distinction between bi-and tripartism implies an important operational decision as to what is essential for the study of corporatism. The focus is either on industrial relations as such or on the interdependent relations of the so-called social partners vis-à-vis the government.
Both types of operationalisation have been developed into nominal and ordinal scales (e.g., Western 1991; Czada 1987; Lehmbruch 1984) . The problem of these scaling techniques is that they are static (fixed rank orders over time) and define the interactions between the actors as more or less structural. A static variable (corporatism) is used to examine a moving target: concerted socio-economic policy-making within a democratic system that is characterised by party government and thus can be expected to change over time (e.g., Lijphart 1999, Chap. 15) .
This has led other scholars to score countries over time as regards the degree of central bargaining, access to institutional arrangements, and rates of conflictual behaviour (strikes) of the participants. (e.g., Siaroff 1999; Iversen 1999; Traxler et al. 2001; Compston 2003; Traxler 2004 ). The problem with these dynamic scales is that the variation over time is limited to bipartite patterns of behaviour only and therefore the policy-making process is either assumed to be corporatist or simply absent. They may well measure the relative strength and presence of the social partners over time, but cannot relate these structural features to their actual behaviour in the process of policy formation. Although this type of dynamic scaling to some extent solves the problem of static indicators, it simultaneously creates another: goal oriented behaviour cannot be incorporated. It indicates the contextual variation of corporatism rather than the process of intermediation as such (Vergunst 2004) .
Most students of corporatism and the related process of policy-making agree that institutions are essential for understanding and have attempted to take these into account. So, the degree of state involvement is mentioned (e.g., Siaroff 1999; Armingeon 1999) ; and the role of party government, in particular of Social Democracy, is taken into account (Woldendorp 2005, 20 ff.) . The incorporation of these institutions into the measures of corporatism is, however, conducive to an almost deterministic view that over time institutions run by the state (Armingeon, 1994) or social democratic government (Gallagher et al. 2006, p. 444) determine the working of corporatist intermediation. In this type of elaboration state involvement and party government are considered as primarily effect-producing and corporatism becomes merely a by-product.
This concise survey demonstrates that the concept of corporatism is frequently operationalised and measured in a way that that decreases internal validity:
• The number of actors involved drives the operationalisation (bi-or tripartite).
• Static comparative scales are insufficient to analyse corporatist behaviour and related effects on, for instance, policy agreements; dynamic measures do focus on behavioural patterns, but without taking into account the related variation of the policy process.
• Institutional arrangements are only indirectly included or are considered to be functionally dependent on the party in government.
These are serious methodological shortcomings, and have led to many studies which have made claims with regard to the working of corporatism that are, in our view, empirically not warranted nor externally valid as regards theory development. Worse perhaps is that corporatism, although defined by most of its students as an amalgam of institutional and behavioural features, is not properly elaborated in operational terms that are suitable for systematic comparative research and conducive to valid and reliable results. In the next section we will therefore develop a conceptualisation of corporatism that allows for valid and reliable measurement and can be used to develop a heuristic framework to empirically analyse corporatist intermediation as an effect-producing variable.
Corporatism as a mode of concerted policy formation
Following Keman (1996 Keman ( , 1999 and Molina and Rhodes (2002) , corporatism is a mode of policy-making that involves the government and the relevant socio-economic actors: trade unions and employers' organisations; rather than a systemic, structural or functional phenomenon characterised by (corporatist) institutions, cooperation and consensus (between trade unions and employers' organisations), unionisation, and social democratic government. 2 The conceptualisation of corporatism as a mode of policy-making implies an analysis of the behavioural patterns of the actors within the institutional context in which the policy-making processes is embedded. In this regard much is owed to Katzenstein (1985) who proposes a conceptualisation of corporatism as a political mechanism to cope with conflict as a consequence of socio-economic change, by incorporating government and organised interest groups in the formation and implementation of incomes policy.
Besides Keman and Molina and Rhodes, other researchers as well have developed actor oriented conceptions of corporatism. For example, Hartog (1999) and van Waarden (2002) emphasise the aspect of co-operation and collective decision-making between party government, trade unions and employers' organisations on the formation and implementation of socio-economic policies in corporatist countries, as do Lehmbruch (1979) and Siaroff (1999) . However, these concepts remain to a large extent static or they lack institutional context. Essential therefore is that the conceptualisation of corporatism stresses both the relative autonomy (institutions) and the mutual instrumentalisation (behavioural patterns) of the actors involved. The rules of the game ensure both the relative autonomy of the actors, and the possibility (not the necessity or inevitability) for mutual instrumentalisation, i.e. joint or interdependent action. Employers' organisations and trade unions have the option to co-operate with each other and with the government. The government can also opt to follow a corporatist strategy of policy formation and implementation or rather choose to unilaterally impose policies on employers' organisations or trade unions. The interactions between the relevant actors are by and large the result of the extant rules of the game (institutions) and the perceived need to co-operate in order to achieve optimal outcomes for all through policy formation (mutual instrumentalisation). In other words: corporatist interest intermediation and the resulting policy formation is conceptualised as patterned variations of institutionalised behaviour between the core actors. The extent to which this game is played is thus not only dependent on the institutional context but also on the role performance of all actors involved. Their behaviour (choice of action) is crucial for the actual working of corporatism (Scharpf 1998) . Hence, the measurement of this behaviour over time is essential for the construction of a valid and reliable indicator that can be used to link theory to empirical evidence in comparative analysis.
The autonomy of the actors is neither unlimited nor unbound. Both the formal rule of law and the more informal institutional setting of consultation and negotiation between the societal actors set constraints. Based on the formal rule of law, ultimately the outcome of the corporatist strategy has to be sanctioned by parliament. Theoretically, therefore, constitutional government can make and change the rules of the game. There are, however, the informal rules and practices that societal actors have to develop as they go, to be able to play the game: the so-called logic of appropriateness (March and Olsen 1989) . These informal rules can only function if actors keep to them and that may be dependent on power relations in terms of veto points and available sanctions (Keman 1999; Olsen 1998) . Nevertheless, within a setting of embedded co-operative policy-making, be it between political parties in a system of proportional representation, or between party government and interest groups in a corporatist setting, the options of open conflict or outright defection are much less accessible than within more pluralist settings (Woldendorp 2005, pp. 41-44; Strøm et al. 2003) .
In our view, this interdependence of actors can be best understood by combining a Rational Choice-approach with some of the insights gained from the New Institutionalism-approach: Rational Institutionalism (Keman 1996 (Keman , 1999 ; see also Shepsle 1995; Scharpf 1998; Peters 2000) . The New Institutionalism-approach points to the constraints on the actions of the different actors within the institutions. The feasibility of their actions motivated by self-interest is limited or defined by their institutional room to manoeuvre. Each actor's feasible selfinterest is translated into a set of options aimed at attaining an optimal solution within the specific socio-political situation. The room to manoeuvre is heavily dependent on the styles of decision-making developed within the institutions. Therefore, institutions should be seen as intermediating variables in which a trade-off or even a pay-off of intentions and feasible options can take place, in such a way that zero-sum games are the exception rather than the rule. A positive-sum game is feasible, given the knowledge and information each actor has about its needs and interests and those of the other actors, which translate into a feasible set of options for each actor, and the institutional constraints that limit each actor's ability to defect. Through the recurrent process of consultation and negotiation, this fosters the occurrence of a logic of accommodation, instead of a logic of conflict (Molina and Rhodes 2002; see also Czada 1998) .
Democratic government plays a vital part in this process. As Keman (1999) shows, in the corporatist arena all actors usually have comparable lists of needs and interests. But these needs and interests differ in importance attached to them by the actors involved. And usually trade unions and employers' organisations have quite conflicting rank orders of preferences. This implies that government has to mediate and encourage the occurrence of viable agreements (compromises) to avoid conflict and promote consensus. 3 At the same time, the government itself is also an actor with a comparable list of interests in a certain rank order. To reach agreement between all three actors, it will be necessary to reorder and thus adjust each actor's list of interests on the basis of potentially shared interests. In the process of negotiation, with all corresponding conflicts, it becomes clear whether or not this reordering may occur and an agreement (compromise) can be reached, and sanctioned by parliament. This agreement is what Shepsle (1995, pp. 283-284) defines as a structure induced equilibrium. This type of Rational Institutionalism assumes that preferences are not given but can be altered during negotiations and, thereby, produce an equilibrium in the end.
We propose a conceptualisation of corporatism that is, first of all, seen as a process. This process is at the very heart of corporatist interest intermediation vis-à-vis socioeconomic policy formation. This approach entails by definition a tripartite arrangement between government, employers' organisations and trade unions. Each actor avails of certain power resources (relative autonomy), the exercise of which is more or less of an interdependent nature. Finally, the interactions in terms of behaviour (negotiations and eventual compliance) can be interpreted as a (strategic) game. Patterned behaviour and institutional arrangement determine how the game is played and what the eventual result is.
To operationalise this approach we developed a heuristic framework that in a systematic and comparable fashion allows for an actor related and case based investigation of corporatism as a process.
Towards a heuristic framework for comparing corporatism
In this section the behavioural patterns of the relevant actors during negotiations on policymaking will be developed by taking the formation and implementation of Dutch incomes policy as a point of reference (i.e. connecting concept to indicators). The aim is to be able to empirically investigate and analyse the interplay between institutions and actors and the relationship between process and outcome of negotiations on policy-making over time. Two dimensions will be elaborated: government's behaviour vis-à-vis the social partners and the behavioural pattern of the social partners themselves.
Government strategy
The strategy of the government in incomes policy involves two stages: the process of negotiations between trade unions and employers' organisations, and the implementation of the (non)agreements eventually reached. In both stages government may intervene, or not, depending on the preferences of the government of the day as expressed in its annual budget (policy agenda). Logically and empirically, four types of government strategy can be observed: I = Passive strategy Government remains passive and abstains from direct intervention in the negotiations between the other actors involved (policy formation). Government neither intervenes in bi-lateral negotiations nor (re)directs its eventual outcomes (policy implementation). II = Co-operative strategy Government restricts its interventions to the facilitation of negotiations between trade unions and employers' organisations (policy formation). If government intervenes in the outcome of the negotiations, it is not expected to go against the outcome of those negotiations (policy implementation). III = Congruent strategy Government actively intervenes by means of policy proposals during negotiations between trade unions and employers' organisations. The government's interventions are aimed at facilitating agreement between all three actors involved (policy formation). Government may intervene in the process by means of policy proposals, but is not expected to go against the outcome of the negotiations (policy implementation). IV = Guiding strategy Government puts its own policy preferences first. Trade unions and employers' organisations are required to accept the government's agenda as the basis for incomes policy (policy formation). Government implements its own policy without much regard for agendas of the social partners or the outcomes of the negotiations (formation and implementation).
Type II and III are regarded to represent typically corporatist strategies. In both types, the government intends to accommodate the process of negotiations between the social partners. The difference between type II and III is that in type II the government tries to facilitate negotiations by offering various (dis)incentives, but leaves formation and implementation of incomes policy largely to the actors involved and is flexible as regards the pursuit of its preferences. In type III the government actively intervenes in the formation of incomes policy with its own (joint) policy proposals, and may actively intervene in the outcome of the negotiations as well (implementation).
Types I and IV are considered to be non-corporatist strategies because the underlying logic of behaviour is not consensus driven. In type I, government refrains from any intervention at all. In type IV, government seeks to implement its own policy agenda disregarding the preferences of the social partners.
Styles of decision-making of trade unions and employers' organisation
Since we are dealing with corporatist interest intermediation, it concerns by definition trade unions and employers' organisations. The style of decision-making refers to the strategy with which these actors try to reach the goals that represent their respective preferences (policy agendas-see Appendix). The common denominator of corporatism is that all actors involved are willing to arrive at a common agenda based on exchanging preferences. As Scharpf (1987) has shown, the co-ordination of agendas may indeed involve co-operative negotiation in a corporatist setting, but not always, nor necessarily. Derived from a game theoretic perspective Scharpf (1998, p. 50 ) distinguishes three strategies within corporatist institutions: confrontation, bargaining, and problem solving.
Confrontation refers to interactions in which "winning, or the defeat of the other side, is the paramount goal" (ibid.: 50). One of the actors assumes its power base as sufficient and its preferences as not negotiable. In game theoretic terms: the first move is according to a Chicken game producing a zero-sum outcome. Bargaining refers to interactions in which "participants are exclusively motivated by their egotistic self-interest and the typical outcome is a compromise" (ibid.: 50). This strategy is known as the Tit-for-tat logic (Axelrod 1984) . Problem solving, finally, "implies the pursuit of common goals and the common search for an optimal solution" (ibid.: 50). All actors take to a strategy that is directed by the assumption that the optimal result reflects an equilibrium that cannot be improved.
In real life actors have often shared and conflicting interests. Therefore, actors will be ambivalent; they will be drawn to co-operation and to conflict at the same time. Yet, this ambivalence also creates the possibility that interests and issues may be redefined through conflict, bargaining and problem solving. Hence the expectation that in real life negotiation processes between social partners may alternate between competition (confrontation or bargaining) and co-operation (problem solving). Based on these assumptions, three modes of behaviour or interdependent styles of decision-making can be distinguished:
Preferences of the societal actors involved differ substantially and thus there is little common ground to reach agreement. Negotiations are either characterised by defection (from negotiations) or by open conflicts (strikes, lockouts and the like). Both actors are on a collision course. B = Bargaining Preferences of the actors feature the same issues and concerns, but with differing emphases with regard to desired solutions and policies (means-end problematic). Negotiations may be protracted and result in deadlocks. Actors may resort to threats (e.g., to defect), butassuming rational behaviour-eventually reaching an agreement is the shared goal. C = Problem solving Preferences of the actors feature the same issues and concerns and share common ground with regard to desired solutions and policies making exchange and compromise feasible. Although negotiations can be characterised by temporary deadlocks, the social partners will continue to strive for the best joint optimal outcome.
These three styles of decision-making can be rank ordered in terms of strategic options that range from open confrontation through bargaining to problem solving by means of regulatory policy formation. In summary: our theory guided concept of corporatism is constructed by relating the substance of the policy process to behavioural aspects embedded in the institutional context. The next step is to develop the matrix that enables the researcher to investigate this empirically.
4.3 Government strategy and styles of decision-making: process and outcome All actors, in this case: party government, and trade unions and employers' organisations, have various strategies and styles of decision-making at their disposal with which to conduct negotiations (i.e. on incomes policy). Obviously each actor can change its strategy and related style of decision-making during the annual bargaining process on incomes policy. In other words, it is a dynamic process until a result in terms of policy formation and implementation is reached. This is in our example an agreement between the actors involved, but obviously a non-agreement or non-implementation of the agreement struck is also a result.
This means that in every cycle of negotiations 12 (4 × 3) options are available and that any possible combination thereof can be theoretically accounted for, based on the (changes in) strategy and style of decision-making employed by the actors involved (see Table 1 ). But not only changes in strategy and style of decision-making can be accounted for, the same goes for consistent government strategies and styles of decision-making. As an instrument of analysis this heuristic framework therefore is suitable for investigating empirical variations of the process of negotiations (here: on incomes policy) across time (and across systems). Table 1 shows the 12 options possible and demonstrates how, during negotiations, trade unions and employers' organisations may employ different strategies, resulting in different styles of decision-making. A combination of styles in which one of the parties opts for confrontation (A) and the other for either bargaining (B) or problem solving (C) will always result in a situation of confrontation, because one of the actors puts its (self) interest first and refuses to co-operate. A combination of styles in which one of the actors opts for bargaining (B) and the other for problem solving (C) will always result in a situation of bargaining, because one of the parties is intent upon resolving the differences between parties, and the other party is not bent on confrontation (Woldendorp 2005, pp. 277-278) . The strategic dimension in Table 1 elaborates the options of government: government strategies II (co-operative) and III (congruent) represent a corporatist government strategy towards a shared incomes policy. Styles of decision-making may range from confrontation to problem solving. Cells IIA and IIIA represent steps in the bargaining process or outcomes in which government pursues a corporatist strategy, but trade unions and employers' organisations opt for confrontation. Notwithstanding the government's corporatist strategy, the outcome in terms of concluding an agreement on incomes policy is not successful. Cells IIB and IIIB represent steps in the bargaining process or outcomes in which the government pursues a corporatist strategy and trade unions and employers' organisations are willing to bargain. Although the government's strategy is corporatist, the outcomes in terms of concluding an agreement on incomes policy may not always be successful. Cells IIC and IIIC represent steps in the bargaining process or outcomes in which the government pursues a corporatist strategy, and trade unions and employers' organisations are most co-operative. In this situation, the outcome in terms of concluding an agreement on incomes policy is usually successful. In other words, in case of a corporatist government strategy, the outcome in terms of an agreement on incomes policy is determined by the style of decision-making of trade unions and employers' organisations.
Government strategies I and IV, the passive and the guiding strategy, respectively, are not considered to be corporatist. Cells IA, IB and IC cover those situations in which the government remains passive in the bargaining process or in the outcome, regardless of the chosen style of decision-making by trade unions and employers' organisations. Cell IC may seem to signify a corporatist incomes policy from the perspective of styles of decision-making. Trade unions and employers' organisations display a high degree of co-operation with each other. However, this would be a contradiction in terms, for in our conceptualization of corporatism a passive government strategy can not be considered as a corporatist incomes policy. This cell represents steps in the bargaining process or outcomes that can also occur in a pluralist setting. We have therefore labelled this situation as quasi corporatist because government has no corporatist intention. The government, which is institutionally required as an actor involved, leaves incomes policy formation to trade unions and employers' organisations. 4 Cells IVA, IVB, and IVC cover the situations in which the government imposes its own incomes policy package in bargaining process or outcome, regardless of the style of decision-making employed by trade unions and employers' organisations. Cell IVC represents an example of what may be called corporativism (state led or authoritarian corporatism -Schmitter 1979) . The main point is again that the government does not have any corporatist intention. The government imposes its own incomes policy on trade unions and employers' organisations. And trade unions and employers' organisations happen to agree on that policy, or to comply with that policy without any resistance.
The corporatist outcomes may be defined as the outcomes in which the government seeks to facilitate trade unions and employers' organisations to find a structure induced equilibrium (or in the Dutch case, a Central Agreement on incomes policy) that cannot be improved for any actor (Shepsle 1995, pp. 283-284) . The substance of the outcome can be explained in terms of a reordering of the lists of needs of each actor that is expressed in their respective agendas. In our conception government is the pivotal actor in this corporatist process of interest intermediation by guiding the reordering of the preferences of all involved. Of course this does not imply that a corporatist strategy of government is by definition successful in terms of agreements on incomes policy. In fact, there are only four outcomes feasible:
• A bipartite Central Agreement between trade unions and employers' organisations.
• A tripartite Central Agreement between the government, trade unions and employers' organisations.
• No Central Agreement.
• A government directed or imposed incomes policy.
This means that the typology presented in Table 1 is exhaustive; all empirical combinations across time (and systems) can be accounted for in substantial terms. To put it differently: this heuristic framework represents a mode of analysis to compare the various processes as they emerge in reality. It enables the researcher to develop a nominal classification describing not only all possible situations, but by linking these to the actual outcomes, they can also be developed into a theory driven ranking order (from a non-corporatist to a typical corporatist performance; or from consensual to conflictual behaviour).
The advantage is that-contrary to going up Sartori's (1970) ladder of generality-the essential information at the case level is preserved, nor has the researcher to resort to radial categorisations or family resemblances (Collier and Mahon 1993) . 5 The latter procedure is sensitive to the researcher's choice and easily leads to invalid and less reliable data (Landman 2004; Dogan and Pelassy 1990) .
However, unlike a typology, the categories (cells) in Table 1 are empirically not mutually exclusive. The four outcomes in terms of agreements on incomes policy in The Netherlands may be reached through a variety of stages and outcomes of the bargaining process, thereby showing both the process and variation over time. And this is precisely the strength of our heuristic framework: it helps to categorize the empirical information systematically in a comparative mode, and it allows for a dynamic interpretation of the process under scrutiny. Whatever the level of comparison-countries, annual change, units within a polity, etc.-it produces an optimal trade-off between conceptual validity and empirical reliability.
In the next section we will demonstrate this by applying the framework to the process of incomes policy formation in The Netherlands. The units of observation are the annual negotiations, the units of variation the actors involved (as presented in Table 1 ), and the typology itself-ordering the actual process-is used to classify the empirical information regarding the behaviour of the actors in relation to the eventual outcome: a Central Agreement (or not). We claim that this method is less sensitive to Dutch-centrist explanations (intra-case bias) and provides comparable information on the formation and implementation of Dutch incomes policy. The underlying logic and elaboration of this heuristic framework makes it-so we argue-a suitable instrument of analysis for investigating the politics of policy making across time and across countries that is beyond the application to Dutch incomes policy as such.
Investigating Dutch incomes policy and corporatism
In Table 2 the results of our investigation are presented. It concerns a sample of the 36 units of observation (i.e. the annual cycle of negotiations between 1965 and 2000). This selection covers the observed variation in process and outcome of government strategies and styles of decision-making of trade unions and employers' organisations presented in Table 1 . The different units of observation and related categorisations will be discussed in order to demonstrate that it is indeed possible to capture all variations, changes and outcomes.
In 1965, the process was dominated by type III strategy of government (congruent) and type A style of decision-making (confrontation). The government tried to broker at least a bipartite, but preferably a tripartite (Central) Agreement between trade unions, employers' organisations and the government. Government actively intervened in the negotiations and tried to facilitate agreement by offering a choice of various policy packages on incomes policy to trade unions and employers' organisations. A deadlock was resolved by government based on a new incomes policy package on which social partners could both agree, albeit reluctantly. Therefore the outcome is classified as positive (Central Agreement) and-due to government behaviour-the style of decision-making changed to bargaining (B).
In 1967, despite reaching no agreement, trade unions and employers' organisations both rejected a government intervention to break the deadlock. Nevertheless, the government decided to intervene with a binding incomes policy package. This is a typical example of the bargaining style that was not modified during the process. Corporatism as a mechanism did apparently not function and a change of strategy did not occur.
In 1974, after the rank-and-file of the employers' organisations rejected a provisional bipartite Central Agreement that was brokered by the government, the (first) oil crisis occurred. The (left-to-centre coalition) government reacted with emergency legislation, enabling it to enforce temporary macroeconomic policies. Social partners subsequently failed again to reach an agreement (moving between style A and B). The emergency legislation was then expanded with a binding wage measure that, as the earlier package, was carefully designed to take into account the agendas of both trade unions and employers' organisations (moving between strategy II and IV). This year is an example of how to systematically classify a complex interaction process until the eventual result. Almost all strategic options were used as well as all available behavioural patterns. Nevertheless, our heuristic framework could capture all changes. In 1983, under strong pressure by the incoming government, an agreement was struck between trade unions and employers' organisations. For social partners, the aim was to keep the government out of incomes policy in the market sector after a series of binding measures during 1980, 1981 and 1982 (hence moving between style B and C) . For the government, the substantive aim was wage moderation in the market sector. The agreement resulted in wage moderation in the market sector. Through all linking mechanisms 6 this moderation extended to the (semi-) public sector as well. Therefore, in the end the government refrained from (binding) intervention in incomes policy in the market sector (moving between strategy I and IV). As in 1974, this year is an example how complex processes of interaction, including the result, can be classified.
With some difficulty, in 1987 the government succeeded in getting trade unions and employers' organisations to participate in a tripartite Central Agreement. This is expressed in the strategy change from II to III whereas the style of decision-making remained the same (B). The substance of this agreement was that parties renewed their commitment to previous bipartite and tripartite agreements on (elements of) employment policies. Employers' organisations determined the outcome with respect to working hours, while trade unions succeeded in countering the government's reduction of the level of social security benefits. Employers agreed to top these up (a typical tit-for-tat outcome).
In 1992, all three parties went their separate ways. Central negotiations did not take place. Decentral negotiations resulted in bilateral compromises between trade unions and employers' organisations in which trade unions managed to get their way (A). Government did not intervene in incomes policy in the market sector (hence: I-passive). All in all this situation can be classified as non-corporatist.
In 2000, consultations between the government, trade unions and employers' organisations on the central level can be characterised as an exchange of not too different points of view on incomes policy. Neither party pressed for a Central Agreement. Decentral negotiations proceeded without much difficulty (B-bargaining) due to a booming economy and a corporatist government policy that boosted buying power of the lower paid and included a partial linkage between the market sector and the (semi-) public sector (II-facilitating).
This brief discussion of the process and outcome of negotiations on the formation and implementation of Dutch incomes policy in a selected number of years demonstrates that the heuristic framework elaborated from a conceptual inquiry of corporatism allows for capturing and understanding the process and outcome in terms of government strategy and styles of decision-making of trade unions and employers' organisations. This overview also shows that the outcome in terms of agreements is indeed reached through different stages and outcomes of the policy process, both corporatist and non-corporatist. In other words, the application of this heuristic framework to Dutch incomes policy-making makes it possible to systematically investigate the interactions between actors, the interplay between actors and institutions, and the variation over time.
Since the results are not static but show variation simplistic interpretations are avoided and this helps to analyse the relationship between input and output (opening and closing strategy in view of the styles of decision-making that have occurred). This examination of Dutch incomes policy also demonstrates that the underlying logic of inquiry induces the researcher to contemplate on the variation observed: similar processes lead to divergent outcomes and vice versa. Therefore, we claim that the application of this heuristic framework demonstrates its usefulness for research. 7 In the next section we argue that our method can be applied to other policy areas within one polity, as well as to comparative research across time and systems.
Discussion: implications for cross-national comparative research
The implications for comparative research of the heuristic framework developed above are twofold. Firstly, it can be used for a more dynamic in-depth analysis of the strategic behaviour within the institutional context of a polity when it comes to the formation and implementation of socio-economic types of policy. It goes almost without saying that our approach is open for cross-time and cross-system analysis. Such an analysis will yield a series of consecutive units of analysis (e.g., annual formation and implementation of policy), that can in turn be used for the comparison of the dynamics of policy-making that involve party government and the relevant actors (in our case: trade unions and employers' organisations). A crosssystem comparison of the policy process in various countries based on this framework can and will contribute to alleviating the existing methodological trade-off between comparing multiple polities and researching a single country, by combining elements of both research methods: comparing multiple cases (across time and across systems) based on evidence that is systematically derived from thick, or qualitative description that allows for externally valid analytical results (Pennings et al. 2006) . Secondly, with some adaptations, this heuristic framework could also be used to investigate and compare the formation and implementation of policies in other policy areas than incomes policy. To apply the heuristic framework it is necessary to identify the relevant political and societal actors in these policy areas as well as their agendas; to identify the relevant formal institutions; and finally to reconstruct the process of negotiations on the formation and implementation of these policies as well as the time frame involved. The application of our method allows for an analysis of the behaviour of the relevant actors in terms of government strategy and styles of decision-making of societal actors. And that analysis can be used for both case studies within a polity (e.g., the EU, a country or a sub-national unit) as well as 7 The empirical analysis of Dutch incomes policy between 1965 and 2000 based on this heuristic framework offers the opportunity to resolve various issues regarding corporatism and the Dutch case (Woldendorp 2005) . For instance, the research shows that in a clear majority of the years governments in The Netherlands preferred to open negotiations on incomes policy with a corporatist government strategy. However, only in a slight majority of those years governments also concluded with a corporatist government strategy. The preferred style of decision-making of social partners appears to have been the bargaining style (B) instead of the co-operative problem solving style (C). And although corporatist government strategies and Central Agreements did go together more often, in a large majority of the years, with or without corporatist government strategies, no Central Agreement could be reached due to this bargaining style (B) of decision-making preferred by social partners.
for cross-national comparison of policy-making in other policy sectors (e.g., labour market or social welfare).
In conclusion, we contend that the heuristic framework elaborated in this paper is a promising instrument of empirical analysis that can bridge the gap between qualitative and quantitative research and between many cases-few variables and few cases-many variables.
Appendix Empirical investigation of the process of negotiations on Dutch incomes policy
The annual presentation of the government's budget is the starting point for the cycle of central (national) negotiations on incomes policy. These negotiations involve the government, and the peak organisations of trade unions and employers' organisations. Chronologically, four stages in this process can be distinguished (van Drimmelen and van Hulst 1987, pp. 34-35) .
Each year, at the end of September, the government presents the budget for the coming year (policy agenda), based on the Macro-Economische Verkenningen of that year (MEV = Macroeconomic Forecasts) issued by the Dutch Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis (CPB). 8 Both the prognoses of economic developments by the CPB and the government's proposed (budget) policies based on those forecasts are important inputs and constraints for the negotiations.
In October or November the trade unions publish their programmes (policy agendas) for the coming year, based on extensive internal discussions. These usually consist of a number of very specific, concrete demands, combined with a number of rather more flexible demands, and are a general framework for negotiations, both on the central and on the decentral level. Either in response, or simultaneously, employers' organisations also publishes their programmes (policy agendas).
Next, negotiations start in the Foundation of Labour. 9 There may be simultaneous consultations going on in the Social and Economic Council (SER) 10 that have a bearing on these negotiations. Usually, the government gets involved as well. These central negotiations may or may not result in a Central Agreement.
Regardless of the outcome of the central negotiations-a Central Agreement, no Central Agreement or government intervention-between December and June decentral negotiations between employers and trade unions on collective contracts on the industry and company level take place. In the absence of a Central Agreement or government intervention, these are 8 The CPB is a government agency, but, similar to the Central Bank, to a large extent independent from the government of the day. It provides the government with economic forecasts. 9 The Foundation of Labour was created after top-level negotiations between unions and employers' organisations during World War II and is also the organisation in which the annual central negotiations on wages and other terms of employment between trade unions and employers' organisations take place. 10 The Social and Economic Council was instituted by law in 1950. Two-thirds of its members are nominated by recognised organisations of workers and employers. The government appoints the remainder. These so-called crown members are called independent experts, but reflect to a certain extent the major political parties. By virtue of their offices, the directors of the CPB and the Dutch Central Bank are also crown members. The statutory powers of the Council are limited to advising the government. Until 1995 the government was legally obliged to ask for a recommendation about all important socio-economic policy measures. In 1995 this was abolished. Nevertheless, successive governments continued to ask the Council's recommendation on all major proposals for socio-economic policies. The Council's recommendations are not binding. based on the policy agendas issued in October or November. These negotiations eventually result in collective contracts, covering any period between one and two-and-a-half years.
Since 1984, the process of negotiations has somewhat changed. Apart from the cycle of negotiations identified above, government and trade unions and employers' organisations also meet for consultation each Spring and each Autumn. The Spring Consultation may take place any time between the end of January and the end of July of any given year; the Autumn Consultation after announcing the budget for the next year. The Spring Consultation gives the government the opportunity to sound out the reactions of trade unions and employers' organisations to government policies that may be proposed in next year's budget in September. The Autumn Consultation is used to persuade trade unions and employers' organisations to come to terms, based on the budget announced for next year. The substance of these consultations may vary from a very brief exchange of points of view to protracted negotiations, which may or may not result in a Central Agreement.
